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NOTES
THE ESSENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION AFTER NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
CITIES: IMPACT OF AN ESSENTIALITY
TEST ON COMMUTER RAIL
TRANSPORTATION
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Usery lim-

ited the applicability of the 1974 amendment 2 to the Fair Labor
Standards Act s (FLSA), which sought to regulate those state and

municipal employees engaged in traditional governmental functions.4 The Court held that Congress, by enacting this amendment,
had exceeded its powers under the commerce clause. 5 In reaching
its decision in NationalLeague of Cities, the Supreme Court relied
on the vague definition of an "essential governmental function"
suggested in New York v. United States.' Although the Court in
National League of Cities prohibited Congress from using the

commerce clause to enforce the wage and hour provisions of the
FLSA in areas in which states are considered to be performing an

essential governmental function, the Court did not satisfactorily
delineate what constitutes an essential activity.8 Consequently,
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)).
3. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as FLSA].
4. 426 U.S. at 836.
5. Id. at 852. Congress derives its commerce power from the United States Constitution.
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ..
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See
generally Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine: The Status of
State Sovereignty Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 300 (1980).
6. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See notes 36-47 infra and accompanying text.
7. 426 U.S. at 851.
8. Id. The Court defined "essential" merely by using words such as "traditional," "integral," "typical" and "fundamental." Id. at 851. One would assume that the Court intended
that these words be used interchangeably. The Court uses both "integral" and "traditional"
in the same phrase: "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id.
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courts have been compelled to make a case-by-case determination
as to whether a particular governmental function should be considered essential.9
The lack of a clear definition of essentiality is particularly significant in the area of railroad employee regulation, where, prior to
National League of Cities, the consensus was that railroads do not
perform an essential governmental function. 10 However, there are
several cases in which the contrary argument has recently been
made that at least commuter rail transportation should be considered an essential governmental function.1"
The purpose of this Note is threefold. First, National League of
Cities will be examined in light of prior case law. Second, the controversial "essential governmental function" language of National
League of Cities will be analyzed in light of subsequent decisions
in order to formulate a clear definition of an essential governmental function. Finally, the impact of a clear definition of essentiality
on local regulation of commuter rail transportation will be
considered.
at 852; and "an integral portion of those governmental services which the states and their
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." Id. at 855. See Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172 n.28 (1977). Professor Michelman suggests two
possible meanings for "integral" which can be gleaned from the context of the decision:
"functions that cannot be foregone or impaired without impairing other functions," and
"those [functions] which exemplify some . . . notion of a core of governmental competency
or responsibility." Id.
9. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 423-26
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., No. 80-7199
(2d Cir. Sept. 15, 1980), petition for rehearingfiled, Oct. 14, 1980; Amersbach v. City of
Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1979); Alewine v. City Council, No. CV 179-113
(S.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 1979) (order denying motion to dismiss). See notes 95-108, 109-21, 175-87,
and 188-92 infra and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175 (1936). See notes 138-47 infra and accompanying text. See also note 150 infra and
accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., No. 80-7199
(2d Cir. Sept. 15, 1980)- New York City Transit Auth. v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d
209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), afl'd, 3 A.D.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1957). See notes 159-87
infra and accompanying text.
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II. Employee Regulation Prior to National League of

Cities
A.

Early Case Law

In Lochner v. New York,' 2 the Supreme Court struck down a
New York statute which limited the number of hours an employee
could work in a bakery."3 The Lochner Court held that, in the employer-employee relationship, the principle of "freedom of contract" ought to prevail over the right of a state to regulate such
relationships.1 4 In addition, the Court suggested that a centralized
federal determination of individual rights should be made, particularly in the area of contract law, in order to protect the individual's
constitutional right to freedom of contract.' 5
In Hammer v. Dagenhart,'6 the Supreme Court, relying on the
principle of freedom of contract espoused in Lochner, declared unconstitutional federal legislation' 7 which prohibited the shipment
in interstate commerce of products of child labor. 8 The Court
sanctioned these questionable employment practices for more than
twenty years until a unanimous Supreme Court overruled
Dagenhart in United States v. Darby.'9 In Darby, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the FLSA as a proper exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause to prevent traffic in
interstate commerce of any product of child labor.2 0 The Court also
12.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

13. Id. at 64. The Court's rationale was one of freedom of contract. Lochner, however, is
predicated on a fear of according the states too much leeway in the exercise of their police
power. See id. at 56-58.
14. Id. at 61.

15. Id.
16. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
17. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675.
18. 247 U.S. at 276-77. The Court relied on several of its earliest decisions, e.g., Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), to justify its interpretation of the commerce power. The
Dagenhartopinion cited Chief Justice Marshall's definition of the commerce power: "[i]t
is
the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."
247 U.S. at 269 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. at 196). The Court in Dagenhart
construed this statement to mean that "the power is one to control the means by which
commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroy it as to particular commodities." 247 U.S. at 269-70.
19. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
20. Id. at 115. Congress expanded the application of the commerce power by prohibiting
the interstate shipment of goods manufactured with child labor. Id. at 113. Congress was
thus able to impose on the states indirectly those federal wage and hour provisions which it
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circumvented its prior reliance in Lochner and Dagenhart on the
principle of freedom of contract, justifying its intrusion into essentially intrastate activity by declaring that it was an extension of
congressional commerce power to regulate those intrastate activities which strongly affect interstate commerce."
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act
In 1938, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).2 2 The FLSA authorized Congress pursuant to its commerce power to implement minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions on the state and municipal level, in stark contrast to
Lochner and Dagenhart, which prohibited government regulation
of the employer-employee relationship. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Darby, Congress expanded the application of
the FLSA to include an increased number of employees.23 In 1974
Congress expanded the definition of employer 24 and professed the
right to regulate all employees of a public agency" engaged in an
could not impose directly.
21. Id. at 118.
22. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976)).
23. The 1966 amendment permitted the regulation of employees of state hospitals, institutions and schools. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80
Stat. 830. The 1974 amendment expanded the scope of the FLSA to encompass employees
of a public agency. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
55 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)). It was the 1974 amendment which led
to the suit by the National League of Cities. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
24. Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 6(2)(1), § 3(d), 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
203(d) (1976)). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 had specifically excluded states and
political subdivisions from its coverage. "'Employer' includes any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the
United States or any State or political subdivision of a State. . . ." Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3, 52 Stat. 1060. The 1966 amendment expanded the definition of
employer to include a state or political subdivision only with regard to employees in a hospital, institution or school. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
sec. 102(b), § 3(d), 80 Stat. 830. The 1974 amendment deleted the language restricting the
application of the term employer to states and political subdivisions and revised the definition to include them as employers except with regard to hospitals, institutions or schools.
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 6(a)(1), § 3(d), 88 Stat.
55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976)).
25. The 1974 amendment enlarged the definition of "enterprise engaged in commerce or
in the production of gTos for commerce" to include one which "is an activity of a public
agency." Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 6(a)(5), § 3(s), 88 Stat. 55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)
(1976)). The amendment also inserted a paragraph defining "public agency" as follows:
"'Public agency' means the Government of the United States; the government of a state or
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enterprise involving interstate commerce. 2 e The thrust of this
amendment was to promote by the use of the commerce power, to
regulate all employees, except those considered so essential to the
independent existence of local government that their regulation required action by the individual state or municipality.
The National League of Cities, individual cities and states, and
the National Governors' Conference brought suit in federal court
challenging the constitutionality of the 1974 amendment.27 A
three-judge panel, relying on Maryland v. Wirtz,"5 dismissed the
complaint, although it was "troubled" by what it perceived to be
valid arguments by the plaintiffs that the FLSA amendments interfered with the states' ability to deliver essential governmental
services.2 9 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and reinpolitical subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States (including the United States
Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a political subdivisioh of a State; or
any interstate governmental agency." Id. sec. 6(a)(6), § 3(x), 88 Stat. 55 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 203(x) (1976)). A public agency, then, employs essentially all state and municipal
employees, whether in the role of a regulator or supervisor, or a participant in the market
place.
26. "Enterprise engaged in interstate commerce" was added in 1966 to include "activities performed for a business purpose," Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-601, sec. 102(a), § 3(r), 80 Stat. 830 (1966), which at that time included activities
performed by employees of state or municipal hospitals, institutions and schools. States objected to Congress' assertion of its commerce power in the area of state and municipal employee regulation. The states argued that the regulation of their own employees was beyond
the province of the federal government and was instead solely within the legitimate exercise
of their own power as sovereigns. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 84146 (1976).
27. Petitioners in NationalLeague of Cities brought suit against the Secretary of Labor,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against application of federal wage and hour provisions to state and local government employees. Petitioners also questioned the overall validity of the 1974 amendment to the FLSA. A three-judge panel in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief might be granted. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in order to
determine the continuing validity of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which had held
that states did not have the power to challenge congressional invocation of the commerce
power. See 426 U.S. at 839-40. The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that
Congress in attempting "to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers,
[had] transgresse[d] an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to other commerce power affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution." 426 U.S. at 841.
28. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).,
29. 426 U.S. at 839. The district court held that it considered the plaintiffs' contentions
to be
substantial and it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it appropriate to draw
back from the far-reaching implications of [MARYLAND V. WIRTZ]; but that is a deci-
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stated the complaint. The Court stated that the plaintiffs had articulated a legitimate claim when they alleged that congressional
interference with certain state and local employment conditions infringed upon a local government's constitutional right to be free
from federal violation of intergovernmental immunity.30
The Supreme Court in National League of Cities relied on
Darby to permit some degree of federal control of employee regulation and on Lochner to limit the extent of that regulation." While
National League of Cities arguably protects the rights of the state
as sovereign, rather than the rights of the employee as an individual citizen,"2 these sovereign rights are confined to the supervision
of employees involved in a function essential to the independent
existence of local government. In all other instances of employee
regulation, National League of Cities reinforces the notion of centralized government regulation, that is, the ability of the federal
government to prohibit local government action, enunciated in
Lochner and Dagenhart8 3 The Supreme Court in both Lochner
sion that only the Supreme Court can make, and as a Federal district court we feel
obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as it stands.
National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D.D.C. 1974).
30. 426 U.S. at 836.
31. See 426 U.S. 833. National League of Cities adheres to the reasoning of Lochner by
prohibiting states from regulating the wages and hours of their employees. But in areas of
"traditional government functions," National League of Cities prohibits the federal government from acting to exercise any commerce power (in direct contrast to Lochner). It then
becomes the state's prerogative to regulate these functions.
32. 426 U.S. at 845. The Court stated:
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the
Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar
exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States
as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner.
Id. See generally Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
33. First, National League of Cities limited a state's ability to impose minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions. (Lochner had prohibited maximum hour regulations altogether.) Second, as National League of Cities barred states from regulating employees performing proprietary as opposed to essential functions the responsibility for regulating these
proprietary employees was left to a third party, the federal government. (Similarly, in Lochner, the federal government determined that all employee regulation was the responsibility
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and Dagenhartupheld the right of the federal government to oversee employee regulation. While National League of Cities and
Darby differ in result, both decisions exhibit similar reasoning.
Both uphold the right of Congress in certain instances to exercise
its commerce power to enforce federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions."
III. Formulating a Clear "Essential Governmental

Function" Test
The Supreme Court in National League of Cities turned to the

general definition of an essential governmental function suggested
in New York v. United States5 to determine whether federal or
state governments ought to regulate local government employees.3 6
However, rather than delineating a working definition of an essential governmental function, the National League of Cities Court
merely stated several examples of activities considered to be essen-

tial.3

The Supreme Court's equivocal analysis of essentiality in

National League of Cities has left the ultimate determination of

the meaning of essentiality to confused lower courts and puzzled
of another third party, the individual employer, under a theory of freedom of contract.) The
main difference between National League of Cities and Lochner is that in Lochner the state
sought to implement maximum hour legislation and was prevented from doing so, whereas
in National League of Cities the states wanted to exempt local governments from federal
minimum wage and maximum hour regulations and were successful as to essential government employees.
34. In Darby, the FLSA was enforced against all employers, public and private, who by
the use of child labor affected interstate commerce, see notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text, whereas in National League of Cities the FLSA was enforced on behalf of all
public employees not performing an essential governmental function. Those employees performing essential governmental functions were exempt from coverage. 426 U.S. at 851-52.
35. 326 U.S. 572, 574, 582-84 (1946).
36. 426 U.S. at 843-52.
37. Id. at 851. The Court mentions "such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation." Id. However, the Court retreats from an
absolute determination of essentiality by saying that "[tihese examples are obviously not an
exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well within the
area of traditional operations of state and local governments." Id. at 851 n.16. Rather, the
Court continued
[tihese activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens
...[and which are essential to their] separate and independent existence.
Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).

156
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commentators.5

A.

The Origin of the Essentiality Standard

In New York v. United States, 9 the State of New York articu-

lated the phrase "essential" or "traditional" governmental function
to support its argument of immunity from a federal tax statute.40
New York, relying on the principle of sovereign immunity, 1 argued

that the statute, which taxed a state owned and operated water
bottling process, 2 interfered with the "exercise of a usual, traditional and essential governmental function. ' 43 The Supreme Court,
in upholding the federal tax statute," acknowledged the growing
dissatisfaction with the principle of sovereign immunity and re-

jected the notion that a state was totally immune from federal regulation. The Court noted that a line must be drawn "between taxa38. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., No. 80-7199 (2d Cir. Sept. 15,
1980); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979); and Alewine v. City
Council, No. CV 179-113 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 1979) (order denying motion to dismiss). See
also Michelman, supra note 8; Tribe, supra note 32.
39. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
40. Id. at 574.
41. Id. at 576. The Court noted that the federal constitutional system gave rise to a
policy of intergovernmental immunity almost from the beginning.
[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other
early led to the assumption that there was reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the other. It was assumed that there was an equivalence
in the implication of taxation by d State of the governmental activities of the National Government and the taxation by the National Government of State instrumentalities. This assumed equivalence was nourished by the phrase of Chief Justice Marshall that 'the power to tax involves the power to destroy.'. . . The phrase was seized
upon as the basis of a broad doctrine of intergovernmental immunity ...
Id.
42. The Court thought that the distinction between "proprietary" and "governmental"
should not provide the basis for limiting congressional taxing power. Id. at 583. Rather, the
Court suggested that state immunity from federal taxation be based on a finding that the
state was performing an activity on which "a tax [was] . . . exacted equally from private
persons upon the same subject matter." Id. at 583-84. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
in New York v. United States achieved a result similar to that in prior cases which addressed the question of state immunity from tax liability. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S.
214 (1934) (federal government has the right to impose income tax on a Boston street railway as a business enterprise of the state); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state is
not immune from federal tax on the sale of alcohol, a business enterprise). South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (state is required to pay federal tax on proceeds from
sale of alcohol, a business enterprise).
43. 326 U.S. at 574.
44. Id. at 575.
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tion of the historically recognized governmental functions of a
State, and business engaged in by a State of a kind which theretofore had been pursued by private enterprise. . .. [Tihere is a constitutional line between the State as government and the State as
trader."4' 5
There are problems inherent in any attempt to draw such a distinction.4 6 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in New York v. United
States, called distinctions between "proprietary" functions (business normally conducted by private enterprise) and "governmental" functions (a service usually provided by government) "untenable criteria"4 7 for making a decision on employee regulation.
Subsequent decisions in the area of sovereign immunity have
wrestled with the theory of consent to suit,4 8 or waiver of immunity. 49 In Parden v. Terminal Railway,50 the Supreme Court held
that the State of Alabama, which had assumed the operation of an
interstate railroad, had "consented" to suits by its railroad employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 1 Although
federal regulation under a theory of implied consent differs from
federal regulation pursuant to the commerce clause, courts relying
45. Id. at 579. See also Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964), where the
Supreme Court, applying the proprietary-governmental distinction, held that the state had
consented to suit by engaging in interstate commerce and so therefore was not permitted to
assert sovereign immunity.
46. 326 U.S. at 580. The Court, however, was not able to determine an effective method
for making that distinction. The Court confined its observations on essential governmental
functions to the following: "[tjo rest the federal taxing power on what is 'normally' conducted by private enterprise in contradiction to the 'usual' governmental functions is too
shifting a basis for determining constitutional power and too entangled in expediency to
serve as a dependable legal criterion." Id.
47. Id. at 583.
48. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall,.440 U.S. 410, 414-18 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781, 782 (1978); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 166 (1979); Jordan v. Weaver, 472
F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973) (alternative holding). See also note 127, infra and accompanying
text.
49. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordon, 440 U.S. 332, 341-45 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 698-700 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 674 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946);
Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Cuidad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir.
1964); Markham v. Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
50. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
51. Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1976)).
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on either of these theories have reached similar results. However,
in Employees of Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare,52 the Supreme Court, relying on the commerce clause theory expressed in Maryland v.
Wirtz5' and refusing to apply the consent theory enunciated in

Parden,permitted citizen employees of the state of Missouri to sue
their employer for overtime compensation under the FLSA5
In Wirtz, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the
FLSA to state-run schools and hospitals.5 5 The Court rejected the
contention that states are not immune from all federal regulation
merely because of their status as sovereigns." The Court reiterated
that Congress, pursuant to the commerce clause, could "override
be described as 'govcountervailing state interests whether these
57
ernmental' or 'proprietary' in character.

The Supreme Court in Fry v. United States,5 relying on Wirtz,
approved the imposition of federal wage controls on state employees.59 In rejecting a suit brought by state employees challenging
the controls the Court reasoned, first, that general economic stabilization would require the efforts of all employees, regardless of
their employer or their function." Second, as Congress "in financing the [Economic Stabilization] Act, . . . specifically rejected an

amendment that would have exempted employees of state and local governments," ' it thereby expressed a clear intent to include
all employees within the group to be regulated. The Supreme
Court stated that Congress, pursuant to the commerce clause could
regulate activity in any area in which the activity in question
might affect interstate commerce," regardless of the function
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

411 U.S. 279 (1973).
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
411 U.S. at 200.
392 U.S. at 193-95.
Id. at 193-96.
Id. at 195.
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
Id. at 548.
Id. at 546.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 547. "Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by
Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations." Id. The Supreme Court upheld
the same congressional action under the supremacy clause to displace a state law with a
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performed.
By permitting the application of these controls to all state and
municipal employees, the Fry Court ignored the "essential governmental function" language of New York v. United States. In National League of Cities the Supreme Court resurrected the "essen3
tial governmental function" and overruled Maryland v. Wirtz.6
B. National League of Cities' Interpretation of Essentiality: Emerging Theories of State Sovereignty
The Supreme Court in National League of Cities understood the
determination of essentiality to be a two-tiered analysis.64 The first
step required a determination as to which powers were conferred
upon the states by virtue of their sovereign status, that is, their
power to act independently." The second step required a determination as to when this sovereign status might be invoked. 6 One
commentator has noted that the Supreme Court in National
federal law. Id. at 548.
63. 426 U.S. at 855. The Court agreed with the conclusion reached by Justice Douglas
dissenting in Wirtz that unchecked assertions of federal power would allow "the National
Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty. , .

."

392 U.S. at 205.

While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in
Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral
portion of those governmental services which the States and political subdivisions
have traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz
must be overruled.
426 U.S. at 855.
64. See 426 U.S. at 845, where the Court suggested, first, that there were certain "attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress ...
" 426 U.S. at 845. The National League of Cities Court however, did no more
than cite one prior example of such an attribute (that is, the location and financing of a
state capital by a state ) discussed in Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). Id. The
Court did not offer a specific test for determining "attributes of sovereignty." Second, once
a decision had been made as to the sovereignty of a state, then an additional determination
had to be made as to the ability of the state to invoke its sovereignty in a particular situation. See 426 U.S. at 845.
65. 426 U.S. at 845. The Court concluded that a state's power to regulate its own employees was a sovereign power. One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their
governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation
will be provided where these employees may be called upon to work overtime.
Id.
66. Id. "The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations [that
is, as to state employee wages and hours] are 'functions essential to separate and independent existence,'" id. (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869)).
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League of Cities "was unclear as to the source of the state sovereignty limitation on congressional power under the commerce
clause. ' ' 67 He further argued that the Court in National League of
Cities apparently relied on the tenth amendment and on a "national mood [which is] increasingly . . . one of disenchantment
with centralized power and a desire for local autonomy." 68
While no clear reasoning as to the essentiality of certain types of
employment has been advanced to justify the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities, four theories of state sovereignty emerge. The first theory advanced by Professor Laurence
Tribe suggests that National League of Cities established a new
spectrum of state and municipal rights. 9 The second contends that
the Supreme Court singled out existing state rights for added protection. 70 The third proposes that the state, as opposed to the federal government, should act as the guardian of the rights of its individual citizens.1 Finally, the fourth theory, advanced by
Professor Frank Michelman, sees the state's choice to allocate certain functions to the private sector (by electing not to perform
them itself) as "no less significant or purposive than its choice to
create governmental responsibilities. '72 Such an interpretation of
National League of Cities necessarily adopts a "welfare-oriented,
functional view of the government as service provider."' "7
The first theory espoused by Professor Tribe points out that
while National League of Cities "may be taken to have established
new 'rights' of states as against the national government ...
Such an interpretation . . . cannot be squared with the distinc67. See Tribe, supra note 32, at 1067 n.17.
68. Id. at 1068-69.
69. Id. at 1072-74.
70. Id. at 1074.
71. Id. at 1074-75.
72. Michelman, supra note 8,at 1169. Professor Michelman observed that it is difficult
to maintain the distinction between government and private activity because "[n]either type
of choice seems any more a matter of a state's. . . 'integrity.'. . . [Tihere seems no a priori
ground for treating either of the reciprocally defining possibilities as primary." Id. According to the service-provider theory, the government is but one of many agents (public and
private) manipulated by the state for purposes of structuring society. Id. at 1168. Because
the government under this theory plays a role like that of any private party, Michelman is
"at a loss to explain why a state's immunity to congressional regulation should encompasss

only its governmental organs." Id.
73.

Id.
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tions drawn by the Court in the process of reaching its conclusion." 4 Professor Tribe argues that the Court employed a dual
standard to determine what constituted a permissible intrusion
into a state's proprietary, as opposed to its governmental, functions. Yet the Court in National League of Cities suggests that its
main concern is with a state's ability to decide how to allocate its
limited financial resources, in which case any intrusion by the federal government, whether 5into a proprietary or a governmental
1
area, would be significant.
A second theory proposed by Professor Tribe sees National
League of Cities as "an attempt [by the Court] to isolate those
functions most essential to the continued significance of states as
separate governmental entities and then to provide enhanced protection in those areas. '"" But the Court only seems willing to permit the state to regulate its employees when it functions as an employer providing a service, and not when it functions as a
legislative or regulatory body. 7" Under this second theory, however,

the Court does not address the fact that this restriction interfered
with the lawmaking ability of a state, one of its most fundamental
7
rights and responsibilitiess.
The Court in National League of Cities concluded that federal regulation of state employees would impair an individual state's ability to structure employer-employee
relationships in areas where the government both administers and
furnishes a public service traditionally afforded citizens by government.79 This language suggests that essentiality be defined not in
terms of preserving sovereignty per se, as under the first theory,
74. Tribe, supra note 32, at 1072.
75. Professor Tribe suggests that any attempt to distinguish proprietary from governmental at this point would not prove helpful. "[I]f the 'right' being protected in National
League of Cities is a state's claim to fiscal autonomy, it is difficult to see why interference
with a state's proprietary functions would be any less intrusive or destructive of the 'right'
than would interference with the 'traditional governmental functions' held sacrosanct in the

opinion." Id. at 1072-74.
76.
77.

Id. at 1074.
"[I]t is difficult to justify the Court's willingness to protect the state in its role as an

employer and provider of services and not in its role as a law-maker and regulator of private
conduct." Id.
78. It is also difficult to justify the Court's unwillingness to respond to the criticism that

its decision interferes with decentralized decision-making by obstructing the state's regulatory functions. See id. at 1075.

79.

426 U.S. at 851. See also note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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but rather in terms of preserving a state's ability to function as an
independent governmental entity. The ability to regulate its em-

ployees enables an employer state to provide services for which it
is responsible to its citizens. Thus the ability of a state to regulate
its employees is at the core of its existence as an independent
entity. 0
Professor Tribe's third theory of essentiality is one which recog-

nizes the power of a state to regulate employees so as to safeguard
their rights as individual citizens.81 Whether this theory stems
from the second theory, that is, that the independent existence of
a state depends on the ability to regulate its own employees so as
to provide its citizens with certain services, or whether it simply
sees the protection of an individual citizen's rights as paramount,
is not crucial. What is crucial, however, is that when this third the-

ory is examined closely, the inference can be drawn that because
local governments have provided certain services over a period of
time, the receipt of these services, while initially a privilege, has
given rise to the existence of protected expectations in the form of
rights to such services.8 2 Thus, the delivery of such a service, which

was once a proprietary function, becomes an essential governmental function, and is therefore
regulation."3

no longer subject to federal

80. Tribe, supra note 32, at 1076.
81. Id. at 1075-76. As Professor Tribe observes, "introducing consideration of the claims
of individuals against government . . . provides an alternative . . . basis for invalidating
legislation otherwise concededly within congress' commerce powers." Id. at 1075. The Court
in National League of Cities examined in detail many government-operated programs, such
as affirmative action police recruiting and general police and fire protection budgets in cities
across the country and observed that, should the municipalities be required to conform their
wage provision to the federal regulations, they would be forced to shut down many of these
services or programs because of higher wages. 426 U.S. at 846-48. Such action would operate
as a penalty to those individual citizens who depend on their local governments to provide
such services. Tribe, supra note 32, at 1079-80.
82. Once citizens come to depend on the government for the provision of such services,
then, it is possible that rights to those services do attach, and in this instance, those rights
would perhaps be endangered. "[This federal] legislation. . . is constitutionally problematic
* * * because it hinders and may even foreclose attempts by states or localities to meet their
citizens' legitimate expectations of basic government services." Tribe, supra note 32, at
1076.
83. The gradual assumption by local governments of responsibility for the provision of
certain services which formerly were provided by the federal government to the states creates a new federal duty not to interfere with the delivery of these services: "[w]hile the
individual right is against the [federal] government, when the federal government leaves to
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The fourth theory of state sovereignty suggests that the states
have elected to delegate the performance of certain functions to
the private sector and to shoulder the obligation to provide the
remaining, theoretically more essential, services themselves.84 The
controversy over whether states ought to be regulated in the provision of these services, and if so, to what extent, stems from an attempt to isolate from federal regulation those governmental services or functions which are deemed essential. Two problems
emerge from the service-provider theory of the government espoused by Professor Michelman. First, it is difficult to define and
set apart essential functions.8 5 Second, it is equally difficult to implement a policy which is able to apportion responsibility for those
functions without impinging on a state's ability to distribute that
responsibility between the public and private sectors.8 6
Professor Michelman observes that reliance on the serviceprovider theory to determine whether a particular governmental
function is essential has met with differing results.87 One interpretation sees an essential service as a "public good" more satisfactorily provided by the public than the private sector."8 A second interpretation views an essential function as one which social justice
demands be freely available." Still another interpretation suggests
that in a legitimate political struggle to protect the community's
interests, the service in question, in order to be deemed essential,
must enjoy sufficient local support in order to prevail.' 0 None of
these interpretations has commanded a consensus. A closer examination reveals the flaws in each perspective.
states and localities the fulfillment of the government duty, it cannot act so as to undermine
the ability of states and their subdivisions to perform that duty." Id. at 1090.
84. See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1173-75.
85. Professor Michelman discusses general "puzzles" which arise in the attempt to formulate a definition of essentiality. Id. at 1175-78.
86. Id. at 1180.

87. Id. at 1177. According to Michelman one must presuppose that the service was being
funded out of general local tax revenues, and not that the service was "unique" or of
"intrinsic importance." "Essentiality" would then be inferred simply by observing the needs

of the electorate. Id.
88. Id. "[C]ollective provision . . . tends towards better satisfaction of private preferences than the private market could achieve .. " Id.

89. The free availability of the service would operate to satisfy a concept of social justice
which appeals to the electorate. Id.
90. Id.
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First, necessary services in such diverse areas as education, garbage collection, insurance and entertainment are provided by a
combination of government and private sector activity.9 Such an
overlap suggests that essentiality cannot be defined solely in terms
of public funding. Second, a small group of services are protected
because they are traditionally provided for citizens by their governments.92 Yet, how essential can a particular service be if citizens
insist that the activity be subsidized in the form of exemption from
minimum wage regulations?" Third, the determination that a particular service is essential is one which is being made by the courts
(thus necessarily rejecting either Congress' or the local sovereign's
assessment as to whether the function is essentially federal or local
in character). Such a determination, that is, which legislative body
is better qualified to regulate the delivery of a certain service by
the local government, constitutes unwarranted judicial interven4
tion into local decisionmaking.9
91. Id. at 1175. This raises a question as to whether Congress is acting responsibly when
it imposes regulations on the private sector service-provider and not on the government
service-provider. Id.
92. Id. at 1179.
93. The irony of the situation is clear. Under these terms, people are willing to pay more
for a service that is not considered essential than for one that is considered essential.
Goods or services that cannot be provided and sold to a willing electorate at a tax
price that covers those costs are, then, apparently less "essential" than whatever it is
the people prefer to purchase instead. It hardly seems apt to call "essential" a group
of governmental services that the electorate will buy only insofar as those services
receive a (relative) subsidy in the form of exemption from an otherwise universal
minimum wage.
Id. at 1175. It is apparent, then, that some other, more workable definition of essentiality is
necessary.
94. Id. at 1176. Courts attempting to determine what is best for the welfare of a state or
political subdivision may be involving themselves in "political questions." See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Courts are ill-equipped to
make such a determination, particularly in the face of a struggle between proponents of
local sovereignty and adherents of congressional policy as to what constitutes an essential
service.
The Court's official position has been that valuation of conflicting welfare concerns is
not a proper judicial function. The conceded "social importance" of an interest or
need provides, according to the established view, no basis for a court's demanding
special government solicitude for that interest or need. Only constitutional recognition of an interest as a "right" can provide such a basis, but none of the social services that ostensibly stirred the Court's concern in the [National League of Cities]
case can claim such recognition.
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C. The Essential Governmental Function After National League of Cities. An Attempt at Clarification
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,5 the Supreme Court narrowed the significance of the term "essential governmental function." The Court confronted with an antitrust suit
brought by the City of Lafayette and several other cities owning
electric utility systems against an investor-owned electric utility,
held that when Congress enacted the Sherman Act" it 7did not intend to exempt municipalities from antitrust liability.
The Court in reaching this decision devoted a significant part of
its discussion to the permissible levels of monopoly activity on the
state and local government level." The Court analyzed, among
other things, whether cities were altogether exempt from regulation as agents of the state;99 whether they ought to be subject to
the same sanctions as individual "persons"; 100 and whether the
Sherman Act was intended to reach a party allegedly providing a
public service and not merely abusing a private power.' 0 ' Chief
Justice Burger, concurring in Lafayette, was convinced, however,
that the issue was simply "whether the Sherman Act reache[d] the
proprietary enterprises of municipalities." 0 1 Turning to the
Court's prior analysis of the proprietary/governmental distinction, 03 the Chief Justice stated that the Supreme Court in
95. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
96. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
97. 435 U.S. at 408. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); City of Mishawaka v.
American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1980); Glenwillow Landfill Inc. v. City
of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671, 677 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
98. 435 U.S. at 397-417.
99. Id. at 398-400. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980) (antitrust immunity can be claimed for governmental action only when
the action is taken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy, actively supervised by the state); Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 20
(2d Cir. 1980); Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.
1980).
100. 435 U.S. at 400-02. See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 356 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 29, 204-10 (1980).
101. 435 U.S. at 403-08.
102. Id. at 422. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
103. Id. at 422 nn.3 & 4. The Chief Justice uses the term "proprietary" to describe those
activities in which the government participates as a competitor, id. at 422 n.3, and, with an
eye to prior decisons, observes that "[states'] business activities are not entitled to per se
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National League of Cities reached the same conclusion as did the
Court in Lafayette as to the recognized distinction between the
state as sovereign and the state as entrepreneur.'" According to
the Chief Justice "the threshold inquiry

. . .

is whether the activ-

ity is required by the State acting as sovereign."10 5 If it is, then the
activity ought to be left to the individual city or state to regulate.106 If it is not, then the activity ought to be subject to the same
regulation as action by private sector employers in the same
field.107 The Chief Justice concluded that "the running of a business enterprise is not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions."108
D. The Criteria for Essentiality: The Amersbach Test
In Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,109 the Sixth Circuit articulated a clear definition of an essential governmental function.110
The court in Amersbach held that the operation of a municipal
airport was an integral function of the city government and therefore its employees were not governed by the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA.111 After "analyzing the services and activities
which the [National League of Cities] Court characterized as typiexemption from [federal regulation]." Id. at 422 n.4. See also notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text.
104. 435 U.S. at 423. "The NationalLeague of Cities opinion focused its delineation of
the 'attributes of sovereignty' . . . on a determination as to whether the State's interest
involved functions essential to separate and independent existence." Id. In other words, if a
state performed a function which proved essential to its independent existence, that function would be a factor in determining a state's sovereignty in that particular area.
105. Id. at 425 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975)).
106. The Chief Justice "would have [cities and states] demonstrate that the exemption
. . . was essential to [their] plan." 435 U.S. at 425, n.6. But in this instance "there seems no
a priori ground for treating either of the reciprocally defining possibilities as primary."
Michelman, supra note 8, at 1169.
107. Other cases in the antitrust area also uphold this dual standard. See, e.g., Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596 (1976) ("There is no logical inconsistency between
requiring such a firm [i.e., a state or municipality] to meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is
exercising its natural monopoly and also to comply with antitrust standards to the extent
that it engages in business activity in competitive areas of the economy."). See also Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963); Public Systems v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 606
F.2d 973, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
108. 435 U.S. at 424.
109. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
110. See notes 112-114 infra and accompanying text.
111. 598 F.2d at 1037.
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cal of those performed by governments" the Sixth Circuit noted
"certain elements common to each which serve to clarify and define a method by which a protected government functon may be
identified.""' 2 The court then identified four factors to be considered in determining whether or not a particular government function is essential. " 8 These factors include: "(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is available
to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of public service rather than for
pecuniary gain; (3) government is the principal provider of the service or activity; and (4) government is particularly suited to provide the service or perform the activity because of a communitywide need for the service or activity."" 4
After the Sixth Circuit established what constitutes an "essential
governmental function," it then turned to the question of whether
Cleveland's municipal airport performed such a function." 5 The
Amerbach court, after observing that the city government played a
vital role in the operation of the airport, concluded that, based on
the enumerated criteria, the city was indeed performing an essential governmental function by operating the airport." 6
First, the maintenance of the airport benefited the community as
a whole and its services, while not free, were substantially subsidized by the city." 7 Second, Cleveland, in maintaining the airport

is not interested in making a profit, but rather is concerned with
providing a service to commuters." 8 Third, as nearly all of the
country's airports are municipal, the government clearly is the
principal provider of this service."' And fourth, the government is
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. See UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5612 (fourth criterion held applicable to commuter rail service).
115. Id. at 1037-38.
116. Id. at 1037. "[We conclude that operation of the Cleveland Hopkins International
Airport is-an integral governmental function within the meaning of National League of
Cities. In operating the airport, the City is providing terminal facilities for commercial air
carriers and related services vital to an effective air transportation system. . . . [furthermore] airports are indispensable in a nation where airplanes are relied upon as a principal
mode of passenger transporation." Id.

117. Id.
118.

Id.

119. Id. at 1038. The court observed that all but two of the 475 commercial airports in
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best suited to deliver this service because of the general community need for an airport."1 0 The Sixth Circuit concluded that it
would be difficult to believe that "the maintenance of a municipal
airport is not an integral function of government."""
Both the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach and Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in Lafayette, have tried to clearly define what constitutes an essential governmental function in light of National
League of Cities.12 ' In order to determine whether local commuter
railroads are considered to be performing an essential governmental function, legislative intent and case law must be examined.
IV. The Essential Governmental Function Test as
Applied to Railroads
A.

Federal Legislation in the Area of Transportation

1. The Urban Mass TransportationAct
2
In 1964, Congress enacted the Urban Mass Transportation Act"

(UMTA). The UMTA was adopted as a response on the part of
Congress to the realization that increased national urbanization required better mass transportation systems.1 24 The congressional
declaration of findings and purpose 8 indicate Congress' belief
"that the welfare and vitality of urban areas, the satisfactory
movement of people and goods within such areas, and the effectiveness of housing, urban renewal, highway, and other federallyaided programs are being jeopardized by the deterioration or inadequate provision of urban transportation facilities and services. ' '112

Accordingly, Congress intended "to assist in the development of
improved mass transportation facilities . . . with the cooperation

of mass transportation companies both public and private,' 2 7 and
the United States and its territories were publicly owned and operated. Id. at 1038 n.7.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1038.
122. See also United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1978) (the suspension
of an individual's California driver's license by the federal government exceeded the scope
of federal authority, and was unduly intrusive on a state's ability to regulate its highways).
123. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1976)).
124. Id. §§ 1601-1601b.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 1601(a)(2).
127. Id. § 1601(b)(1). This would include a state or municipality as an employer engaged
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"to provide assistance to State and local governments and their
instrumentalities in financing such systems, to be operated by public or private mass transportation companies as determined by local needs."' 28
In each of the amendments to the UMTA, the language is increasingly emphatic in its recognition of the essential nature of
transportation, to the point of promoting regulation by local governments,"' a fact which is by no means inconsistent with prior
railroad legislation. 180
2. The Railway Labor Act
Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 18' first, to establish a procedure for resolving national labor disputes involving railroad workers 3 s and second, to remove the operation of railroads
from the hands of the government and place them into the hands
of private ownership. ' The legislative history of the RLA, as well
as the Act itself, implies that there is a distinction to be drawn
in the business of public transportation.
128. Id. § 1601(b)(3). The choice of language in the amendments is particularly interesting. The original UMTA points out that "[flederal financial assistance [for mass transportation] . . . is essential to the solution of these urban problems." Id. § 1601(a)(3).
129. Id. § 1601(a). ("[IJt is imperative, if efficient, safe and convenient transportation
compatible with soundly planned urban areas is to be achieved, to continue and expand the
provisions of this chapter. . . .") Id. By 1974, when the second amendment was adopted,
the congressional findings expressed the sentiment that "transportation is the lifeblood of
an urbanized society," id. § 1601b(2); and that "the maintenance of even minimal mass
transportation service in urban areas has become so financially burdensome as to threaten
the continuation of this essential public service." Id. § 1601b(7). Finally, in 1977, Congress
passed an amendment providing for annual reimbursement of states and municipalities "for
the cost of financially supporting or operating rail passenger service." Id. § 1614(a).
It is important to note that although the federal government has authorized increased
expenditures for mass transportation, "[tihis fact does not affect the state immunity determination . . . [because] schools, hospitals and law enforcement all receive federal aid, but
are considered integral state governmental functions." UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5615 n.26.
130. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151188 (1976)).
131. Id.
132. Id. §§ 152-160, which provide for mediation and arbitration procedures.
133. Staff of Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of The Railway Labor Act, as Amended (1926 through
1966) 390 (Comm. Print 1974). In fact, the legislative intent is clear from congressional discussion: "This bill turns us away from Government ownership. It takes the Government
almost entirely out of the question of operating the railroads and settling disputes arising in
their operation." Id.
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between freight and passenger railroads. The RLA refers to carriers of interstate commerce, 184 as opposed to local commuter railroads, suggesting that the RLA pertains solely to interstate freight
service. The legislative history of the RLA also focuses on the interstate freight nature of American railroads. At one point, the legislative history even highlights the United States' annual total
freight delivery in contrast to freight deliveries in other countries.18 5 However, the legislative history of the RLA does not reflect
an express congressional desire to impose restrictions on local commuter rail service. The absence of a legislative statement should
not, however, be interpreted as signifying a congressional presumption in favor of federal regulation of essentially intrastate, local
commuter rail transportation. In all likelihood, Congress did not
envision such a service in 1926.
The RLA seems more suited to the regulation of national railroads, whereas the apparent focus of the UMTA on mass commuter rail transportation suggests that this type of transportation,
once funded by the UMTA, is particularly suited to local government regulation. While the RLA deals with privately-owned and
operated national freight railroads, the UMTA is concerned with
municipally-owned and operated local commuter rail transportation. The applicability of either the RLA or the UMTA to a particular railroad controversy does not preclude the validity of the
other Act in a different situation. The two acts simply apply to
different factual situations and therefore one ought not to be seen
as encompassing or displacing the other.
B. The Essentiality of State-Provided Railroad
Service: The Initial Perspective
Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has reviewed the application of the RLA to several state-owned and operated railroads.
134.

45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).

135. Staff of Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of The Railway Labor Act, as Amended (1926 through
1966) 391 (Comm. Print 1974). "The United States Department of Commerce shows that
our railroads move more than [400 billion] tons of freight I mile each year. To do this they
employ a ratio of 5 men for each [1 million] tons of freight 1 mile. The ratio is 23 in Germany, 24 in Italy, and 31 in Switzerland." Id. The legislative history suggests that when the
RLA refers to railroads and railroad workers, it refers exclusively to freight service on a
national scale.
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The decisions in this area'" 6 reflect the belief that, because the
RLA provided for federal intervention in labor disputes involving
railroad employees, 8 7 such intervention in disputes involving
state-owned and operated railroads was appropriate first, because
railroads were invariably associated with interstate commerce and
second, because the state was acting in a business capacity.
The Supreme Court in United States v. California'" held that
the State Belt Railroad, " "' although owned and operated by the
State of California, was a common carrier engaged in interstate
commerce, and as such, was subject to federal regulation.14 0 The
Court stated that through congressional invocation of the commerce clause "[t]he sovereign power of the states is necessarily
diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.'' 1 The Supreme Court's determination that state-provided transport (specifically railroads) was not
considered an essential governmental function stood unchallenged
for more than twenty years.
The Supreme Court in California v. Taylor" 2 held that Congress
had authority under the commerce clause to regulate the employ136. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936); Reeves, Inc. v. Kelly, 603 F.2d 736, 738 n.2 (8th Cir. 1979); Staten Island Rapid
Transit Operating Auth. v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393
N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
137. 45 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976).
138. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
139. The State Belt Railroad was a terminal railroad shipping interstate freight along
the San Francisco waterfront to and from connecting carriers which transported the goods
in interstate commerce. Id. at 182.
140. This federal regulation consisted of congressional exercise of the commerce power,
in the form of the Safety Appliance Act, Act of March 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (codified
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-46 (1976)), which permitted the federal government to override the State's
power to regulate its own enterprises regardless of whether the state operated in its "sovereign" or "private" capacity. 297 U.S. at 183.
The Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934), held that the trustees of
a state-owned street railway were not exempt from the payment of income taxes simply
because they managed a governmental enterprise. The Supreme Court pointed out that by
the operation of a street railway "the State . . . is undertaking a business enterprise of a
sort that is normally within the reach of the federal taxing power and is distinct from the
usual governmental functions that are immune from federal taxation in order to safeguard
the necessary independence of the State." Id. at 227. However, the Court did not define an
"essential" governmental function. See also notes 39-47, 103 supra and accompanying text.
141. 297 U.S. at 184.
142. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
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ees of the State Belt Railroad. ' " The Court reasoned that even

though the railroad was owned and operated by the State of California, it was considered a common carrier engaged in interstate
commerce."' The Court in Taylor disregarded the argument made
in United States v. California that because the RLA was not expressly applicable to the states, the states as sovereigns were exempt from its coverage."15 The Taylor Court, however, relied on
United States v. California to voice its concern for the unequal
effect an adverse decision would have on a private sector employee
6
performing the same tasks as an exempt public sector employee."
In sum, the Supreme Court in Taylor found the RLA to be

applicable to the State Belt Railroad. The Court observed that "if
California, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, subjects
itself to the commerce power so that Congress can make it conform
to federal safety requirements, it also has subjected itself to that
power so that Congress can regulate its employment
relationships.
143. See note 124 supra. See also Reeves Inc. v. Kelly, 603 F.2d 736, 738 n.2 (8th Cir.
1979).
144. 353 U.S. at 563-64. The facts in Taylor are similar to those in United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In United States v.California, the same state-owned railroad sought exemption on behalf of its employees from the Federal Safety Appliance Act,
see note 120 supra, arguing that the state, by operating the railroad, was performing an
essential governmental function. In Taylor, the controversy centered around the application
of a federal labor statute, the Railway Labor Act, which is discussed at notes 112-16 supra
and accompanying text.
145. 353 U.S. at 562. The Court relied on United States v. California to dismiss this
claim. The presumption that "a federal statute . . . [does not] . . .restrict a constituent
sovereign State unless it expressly so provides . . . 'is an aid to consistent construction of
statutes of the enacting sovereign when their purpose is in doubt, but it does not require
that the aim of a statute fairly to be inferred be disregarded because not explicitly stated.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 186).
146. 353 U.S. at 562-63.
We can perceive no reason for extending it [the presumption] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action.
Id. at 562-63 (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 186). Thus the Taylor Court
reached the same conclusion as did the Court in United States v. California on the question
of federal regulation of railroads.
147. 353 U.S. at 568. For an illustration of the Court's general consistency in this field,
see Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The Supreme court in Pardenheld that a
state could not be sued without its consent. The Court found that the State of Alabama had
"consented" to potential lawsuits by assuming control of a railroad which the state knew to
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Despite the fact that this language is somewhat reminiscent of
the consent theory vitiated by Employees of the Department of
Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare'4 8 and that a broad interpretation of congressional power
pursuant to the commerce clause is no longer valid,'' California v.
Taylor and United States v. California are still considered to be
persuasive.e 0

C. Recent Decisions in the Area of Transportation
1. The Effect of Injunctions Against Suit: Which Court Has
Jurisdiction?
One element of the essentiality determination is the issue of
which court, state or federal, has jurisdiction in a dispute involving
the right of state or local government employees to strike. Generally, the federal anti-injunction statute' 5' will bar injunctions
against pending state proceedings in the absence of three clear exceptions.' Two reasons have been expressed to justify these exceptions. First, there is a long-standing federal policy of avoiding

undue interference with legitimate state activities.'5

s

Second, an

injunction is an equitable remedy, and a federal court cannot exercise equity jurisdiction if an adequate remedy is available under
be operating in interstate commerce. See also Public Serv. Co. of N.C., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1979), in which the Fifth Circuit also concluded that when a state either provides a service or moves a product in interstate commerce (as in Parden), the state has opened itself to federal regulation in that area.
148. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
149. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1977); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 58-62 (1976).
150. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18, in which the Supreme Court
states that its prior holdings in United States v. California,Taylor and Parden are "consistent with" and "unimpaired by" this decision. But see 426 U.S. at 854-55, where the Court
limits its approval of United States v. California,by disavowing dicta which does not reflect
the need to restrict congressional exercise of the commerce power so as not to "force directly
upon the States [Congress'] choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made." Id. at 854-55. See also Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 454-60 (1978).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
152. See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
153. This policy draws support from the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which provided that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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state law.1 54 Thus, the only time an injunction will issue is when
the party seeking the injunction can demonstrate an otherwise irreparable injury, coupled with either a showing of bad faith harassment by the adverse party or a flagrantly unconstitutional state
statute which authorizes the adverse party's activity. The question
of whether an injunction should issue, and if so, under which
court's jurisdiction, was considered by the Supreme Court in
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
1 55
Engineers.
In Atlantic Coast Line, the Court held that a federal injunction
obtained by the striking union against the enforcement of a state
ordered anti-picketing injunction previously obtained by the railroad was improper. 158 Relying on principles of federalism, comity,
and state sovereignty,1 57 the Supreme Court denied a lower federal
court the right to contest the decision of a parallel state court absent certain specifically defined exceptions.'" The inference can be
154. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943).
155. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
156. Petitioner railroad (ACL) sought to enjoin respondent union (BLE) from picketing
its switching yard. ACL first sought an injunction in federal district court in Florida but was
unsuccessful. ACL then submitted the same request for relief to a Florda state court, which
granted the injunction. In 1969, two years after the anti-picketing injunction was issued, the
union moved in state court to remove the injunction, relying on Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969). Jacksonville Terminal decided after ACL had
sought its first injunction, invalidated, in certain instances, state court injunctions which
interfered with a federally protected right, such as the right to picket under the Railway
Labor Act. The state court denied the motion, holding that Jacksonville Terminal was not
controlling. BLE then moved for injunctive relief in the same federal district court that had
denied ACL's initial motion for an anti-picketing injunction and was granted an injunction
restraining the continuation of the state court injunction. The Florida Court of Appeals
affirmed the power of the federal district court to issue such an injunction. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the union should have pursued the review of the state court
decision in the Florida appellate courts and then, if necessary, in the Supreme Court. 398
U.S. at 296. The Court also held that the district court's initial denial of ACL's motion for
an injunction could not be interpreted as a decision creating a federal right to overrule an
injunction based on state law. (Thus the denial of ACL's motion for injunctive relief could
not be held to anticipate Jacksonville Terminal, as the union tried to argue for the first
time in the Supreme Court). Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. at 293.
157. Id. at 286-88.
158. The three exceptions to the otherwise absolute prohibition against a federal court's
enjoining state court proceedings are: (1) if the injunction is expressly authorized by Act of
Congress; (2) where the injunction is necessary in aid of its [the federal court's] jurisdiction;
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drawn from Atlantic Coast Line that if an employment dispute is
essentially local in character, the resolution of the dispute is within
the jurisdiction of the state courts. If, however, the employment
dispute has national consequences, there is a presumption that a
federal question is at issue. Therefore, the resolution of the dispute
is within the purview of the federal courts and cannot be considered to be an interference with an essential local governmental
function.
2. Invocation of the Anti-Strike Injunction at the Local Level
In New York City Transit Authority v. Loos,'5 9 the New York
City Transit Authority sought an injunction restraining members
of the Motormen's Benevolent Association from striking under the
New York Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (the Taylor
Law).' 0 The New York City Transit Authority alleged that commuter transportation performed an essential governmental function like the police and fire departments and therefore were subject to the anti-strike provisions of the Taylor Law. 6 ' The New
York County Supreme Court, Special Term, in granting the injunction, held that "[tihe operation of rapid transit facilities in the
City of New York is properly and necessarily a. governmental
2
function.'
The Loos court, focusing on the fact that the standard for governmental functions is necessarily a dynamic and not a static
one,' 6 noted that the rapid transit system was responsible for seeing that millions of people arrived at work safely, including those
64
personnel who perform other essential governmental functions.1
and (3) if the injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate its [the federal court's] judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
159. 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 A.D.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d
564 (2d Dep't 1957).
160. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1976).
161. 2 Misc. 2d at 735, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
162. Id. at 737, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
163. "The defendants deny that the operation of such rapid transit facilities is properly
a governmental function. But this is not the nineteenth century and the City of New York is
not a horse and buggy town." Id.
164. According to the court:
all essential services would soon be disrupted; those who work to supply the people
with food and other necessities of life, the police-who guard us against crime and
disorder and the men who protect us in case of fire, to say nothing of doctors, nurses,
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In response to the argument that the operation of a rapid transit
system is a proprietary, and not a governmental function, the New
York Supreme Court concluded that "the traditional distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions [was] somewhat
outworn." 165 However, as stated earlier,"6 there is also an important distinction to be made between the types of rail service discussed in United States v. California and in New York City
Transit Authority v. Loos. The former deals with the transportation of essentially interstate commerce in freight and the latter
deals with the transport of essentially local commerce in
passengers.
The distinction between local and national labor disputes articulated in Atlantic Coast Line had earlier played an important role
in Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority ("SIRTOA")
v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 1 " In SIRTOA,
the New York Supreme Court enjoined a union from striking
against SIRTOA "pursuant to the Taylor Law." "
The Second Department, in upholding the application of the
Taylor Law in SIRTOA, observed that a railroad operating in interstate commerce falls within the ambit of the commerce clause
and is thereby subject to federal regulation. " Similarly, the Secpharmacists and countless other indispensable workers, would be unable to reach
their appointed places of duty.
Id. at 737-38, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
The Second Circuit in UTU v. LIRR reached the same conclusion observing that "without
the LIRR commuters would find it difficult or impossible to get to their jobs and the reduced influx of people into N.Y.C. would have a significant impact upon the economy of the
city and the State." UTU v.LIRR, slip op. at 5611.
165. Id. at 739, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 215. The court saw the distinction as being developed
initially to limit
civil liability by a city . . .for the acts of its employees engaged in performing a
governmental function. . . .Such distinctions between governmental and proprietary
functions are no longer necessary when there are statutes . . . making municipalities
liable for wrongful acts of police, firemen and others performing the purest [most
essentially] governmental services within the strictest meaning of the phrase.
Id.
166. See notes 123-135 supra and accompanying text.
167. 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
168. Id. at 615, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact
that the RLA had been judicially determined to permit primary strikes. Id.
169. The court in SIRTOA relied on California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, when it observed
that "there is no doubt that when a State or one of its political subdivisions owns and
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ond Department noted that the operation of a railroad has traditionally not been considered to be an integral govermental function
left to the individual states for regulation under a theory of state
sovereignty. ' ° However, the court determined that SIRTOA was
not operating a railroad in the traditional sense and was therefore
not subject to regulation under the commerce clause. 7 1 The court
made an important distinction between railroads engaged in interstate commerce and SIRTOA. "SIRTOA is essentially an intrastate passenger or commuter operation, fully akin to the city's
'1 7
rapid transit system." '

SIRTOA's status as an essentially intrastate, local commuter rail
service led the appellate division to conclude that SIRTOA was an
essential part of the city's commuter rail system, was performing
an essential governmental function, and was therefore entitled to
invoke the Taylor Law. Applying the essential governmental funcoperates a railroad which is directly engaged in interstate commerce, it thereby subjects
itself to the commerce power and that Congress can regulate its employment relationships."
57 A.D.2d at 615, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
170. Id. Here, the court based its observation on the holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. "The operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not
an integral part of State governmental activities which are protected from congressional
impairment by principles of State sovereignty." Id.
171. 57 A.D.2d at 615-16, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775-76.
172. Id. The court then observed that the city was "committed" to absorbing the corporation's deficit and held that its operation was "in no way comparable to the State-owned
switching or terminal railroads held subject to federal jurisdiction in California v. Taylor.
.. . The connection between SIRTOA and interstate commerce is extremely tenuous....
It is not a vital link in the national transportation system, the continued operation of which
is important to the national flow of commerce; and the instant labor dispute does not present problems of national or even regional magnitude." Id. at 615-16, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 77576. The court reached its decision after considering the argument that SIRTOA was technically within the ambit of the Railway Labor Act, as the union asserted, because its employees had "a strong history of bargaining under that act." Id. at 615, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775. For
two reasons both the state trial and appellate courts rejected this argument. First, although
the Railway Labor Act has extensive provisions for arbitration and negotiation which serve
as a model for settling disputes, they were not expressly made applicable to the employees
involved in the SIRTOA dispute. Therefore, the prior use of the RLA's bargaining provisions by SIRTOA employees indicated merely a desire to apply a workable negotiating format to their situation, not an intent to be bound by the strictures of the Act in all future
disputes.
Second, the fact that SIRTOA came literally within the scope of the RLA because of two
technicalities (e.g., the prior arbitration and SIRTOA's operation pursuant to an ICC certificate) was not sufficient reason for the court to find in favor of the union. See also UTU v.
LIRR, slip op. at 5602-04.
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tion test established in Amersbach,'75 SIRTOA's status as an employer whose employees are engaged in an essential function becomes clear. First, the government service or activity-in this case,
commuter rail transportation-does benefit the community as a
whole and is available to the public at little or no direct expense,
because the city underwrites SIRTOA's operating deficit. Second,
the service or activity in this case is certainly one undertaken for
the purpose of public service rather than pecuniary gain, again because SIRTOA operates at a substantial deficit. Third, government, in this case, the city, is clearly the principal provider of the
service or activity, and fourth, this government is ideally suited to
provide the service of commuter transportation because of a
1 74
demonstrated community need for the service.
D. Essential Governmental Function Test Applied to
Commuter Rail Transportation
SIRTOA is similar to a recent Second Circuit decision, United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road (UTU v.
LIRR).17 In UTU v. LIRR, seven unions representing LIRR employees struck the LIRR on December 8, 1979.176 On February 12,
1980, the unions brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the
LIRR's invocation of the Taylor Law. As in Atlantic Coast Line,
the district court refused to permit a federal action which contested the authority of a parallel state court.17 7 LIRR succeeded in
obtaining an injunction pursuant to the Taylor Law in state court
on February 13, 1980. Shortly afterward, the UTU moved in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
for a declaration that the LIRR and its employees are covered by
the RLA and not by the Taylor Law, and for an injunction re173. See notes 109-14 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 123-29 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the UMTA, reflecting Congress' determination that mass transportation is essential to the continued viability of urban areas.
175. No. 80-7199 (2d Cir., Sept. 15, 1980).
176. The union members returned to work six days later by Presidential order for a
sixty-day cooling-off period. Exec. Order No. 12182, 44 Fed. Reg. 74785 (1979). The President's urgent tone reflects the potential disruption in service a strike would precipitate:
"This dispute, in the judgment of the National Mediation Board, threatens substantially to
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive a section of the country of
essential transportation service..
" Id. This language mirrors the UMTA.

177.

See notes 155-58 supra and accompanying text.
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straining the LIRR's pending state proceeding. The district court

granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by UTU. The
court held that the LIRR was a carrier within the Interstate Commerce Act and the Railway Labor Act and that as such, its employees were governed exclusively by the RLA and were therefore not
178
subject to the Taylor Law.
The principal issue on appeal is whether the LIRR is a carrier
subject to the RLA or whether the LIRR is an essentially local
commuter passenger rail service (like SIRTOA), performing an essential governmental function.

Although the Second Circuit recognized that the LIRR is technically a carrier within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act

and the Railway Labor Act,17 9 the court held that the employees of
the LIRR are subject to the anti-strike provisions of the Taylor
Law.18 0 In reaching this conclusion the Second Circuit noted first,

that the RLA ought not to be applied literally to circumstances it
had never anticipated, that is, an essentially local commuter rail
178. UTU v. LIRR, No. 79-3118, (E.D.N.Y. March 5, 1980). See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Dramarsky, 485 F. Supp. 300, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In Delta Air Lines, provisions of New
York's Disability Benefits Law, N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 205(3) (McKinney 1976), were
held not to be preempted by collective bargaining provisions of the RLA. The court in Delta
Air Lines concluded that state legislation can avoid federal preemption where:
(1) the condulct regulated by the state touches interests "so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility that, in absence of compelling congressional direction, [a
court] could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.
(citation omitted) or
(2) the state's regulation pertains to activity that is "a merely peripheral concern"
of federal labor policy.
485 F. Supp. at 309 (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959); Lodge 76, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 1b7 (1976)) 485 F. Supp. at 308. See also Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 87 Wis. 2d 56, 273
N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1978).
179. UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5602-03. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v.
SIRTOA, Finance Docket No. 29011 (Nov. 8, 1979) (Interstate Commerce Commission held
LIRR to be a carrier subject to the RLA). The Second Circuit noted that the opinion of the
ICC, although not conclusive, did have "some persuasive value." UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at
5603. The court also distinguished United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), see notes
138-41 supra and accompanying text. The court found that, unlike the State Belt Railroad,
which "was solely a freight service," UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5611, the LIRR "as a provider
of passenger transportation in a metropolitan area, furnishes a very important public service
which has come to be supplied primarily by state and local governments." Id.
180. UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5618-19.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

system,"" and second, that the LIRR does perform an essential
governmental function, despite contrary dicta in National League
of Cities. as
LIRR contended that, analyzed in light of the criteria established in Amersbach, it must be considered to be performing an
essential governmental function.18 First, the service provided by

the LIRR benefits the entire metropolitan community. In addition
to serving over 260,000 commuters daily at a small direct cost to
the riders, as compared with the overall operating cost of the railroad, the LIRR saves the city from the automobile congestion
which would otherwise result. Second, the primary purpose of the
LIRR is to provide a public service and not to make a profit. This
purpose is evidenced by the fact that the LIRR consistently operates at a loss."8 4 Third, because the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (the parent of the LIRR) is a public benefit corporation,
the government is the principal provider of the service in question.
Fourth, because of the demonstrated community need for, the
LIRR and the extensive expenditures required for its operation,
the government is particularly suited to provide this service.186 The
181. Id. at 5604.
While it is argued that Congress also would have created an exclusion for the LIRR if
it could have foreseen how the railroad would evolve, we decline to legislate such an
exception. Apart from a general reluctance to undertake such a task, we note that it
is not clear what Congress would have done in this instance.
Id.
182. Id at 5610-11.
183. See notes 109-14 supra and accompanying text.
184. UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5615. These losses have been extensive. According to the
LIRR:
The State has poured over a billion dollars into the New York metropolitan area
commuter network in general, and hundreds of millions of dollars into the LIRR, in
particular. For example, in 1979 alone, New York provided the LIRR's passenger operations with its own and local subsidies of $129 million, as well as allocating an additional $9 million of scarce federal Urban Mass Transportation Act entitlements to the
LIRR. In 1979, the State and its municipalities also contributed over $550 million to
the operating deficits of the New York metropolitan area transit network. In addition
to the direct subsidies, New York has granted tax exemptions to the LIRR since 1950.
In fact, the LIRR barely survived the post-World War II years, and then only as a
result of this tax relief and indirect and direct subsidies.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 7, UTU v. LIRR, No. 80-7199 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 1980).
185. UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5615. The LIRR pointed out that
New York is operating the LIRR, not as a private freight business, but rather in the
exercise of its traditional function of providing commuter transportation services to
the New York metropolitan area. New York has poured over a billion dollars into the
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LIRR successfully argued that an additional element should be added to the Amersbach test: in determining whether an employee is
performing an essential governmental function, a court should consider that any interruption of the public service in question would
cause great harm to the community. 186 The Second Circuit held
that the LIRR satisfies this additional requirement.17
In a similar vein, in Alewine v. City Council,88 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia has been
asked to extend the FLSA to bus drivers who are employed by the
City of Augusta. In Alewine, bus drivers sued the City of Augusta,
seeking back overtime pay under the FLSA.'5 9 The City of Augusta, once again relying on National League of Cities, has argued

that the FLSA minimum wage and maximum hour provisions are
not applicable to employees of a state or political subdivision as a
matter of law.' 90 The city contends that these provisions have "directly displaced the states' freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions." " ' In denying the
city's motion to dismiss, the district court observed that the city
had failed to establish "that the operation of a city bus service is a
'traditional' governmental function within the ambit of the rule in
metropolitan commuter system without any expectation or hope of financial return.

The LIRR itself has generated deficits well into the hundreds of millions of dollars
which the State has reimbursed. No private business would continue to operate such
a system under the circumstances. New York, however, continues to subisidize the
LIRR as it has done for many years in its efforts to continue uninterrupted commuter
rail service within the metropolitan area, because that service is vital to the well being
of the metropolitan area-as essential as sanitation, park and recreational services.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 28, UTU v. LIRR, No. 80-7199 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 1980).
186. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 22.
187. UTU v. LIRR, slip op. at 5608. "By precluding the State from enforcing this legislation, including its no-strike provision, the Railway Labor Act eliminates a key provision in
the State's legislative effort to provide its citizens with continuous public transportation."
Id. See Effect of RailroadMergers on Commuter Transportation:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1138 (1970) (Statement of William J. Ronan, former Chairman of the New
York State Metropolitan Commuter Transit Authority).
188. No. CV 179-113 (S.D. Ga., Oct. 22, 1979) (order denying motion to dismiss).
189. Id. at 1.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 3. The court took note of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Marshall v. City of
Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978), to conclude that the FLSA standards were still applicable to employees working "in areas which are not 'integral parts of [a State's] governmental activities.'" Order denying motion to dismiss at 3-4.
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National League of Cities."'
V.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court in National League of Cities, relying on
Fry, Darby, New York v. United States and Lane County v. Oregon,1 9 3 emphasized its awareness that the states performed an essential role within our federal system. The Court understood that
state employees performing "essential governmental functions"
must be free from federal regulation. Unfortunately, the Court
neither definitively established what constitutes an essential governmental function nor constructed a workable test for making
such a determination.
Subsequent decisions, in particular Amersbach and UTU v.
LIRR, have constructed an "essential governmental function" test
to facilitate a case-by-case determination of essentiality. The test
requires a showing that the government service or activity benefits
the entire community at little direct expense, that it is undertaken
for public service and not for profit, that the government is the
principal provider because of a particular capacity for such a service, and that any interruption of this essential public service
would cause great harm to the community. Under this test, it appears that the historical exclusion of railroad operation from the
192. The district court concluded that the cases which the City of Augusta cited "only
serve[d] to reveal the doubt in this area and thus to underscore the impropriety of resolving
the issue on a Motion to Dismiss." Order denying motion to dismiss at 4. The court also
found defendant's other arguments insufficient to compel a finding in its favor. For example,
the city asserted that "there is not a viable private transit industry remaining in the United
States." Brief for Defendant (cited in order denying motion to dismiss at 4). The court
found this assertion inconclusive without other authority. Order denying motion to dismiss
at 3-4. Second, the court disagreed with the city's reliance on the state's method of classifying municipal functions, holding that while the court need not be bound by'such classifications, "the Georgia Court's decision of those functions as 'proprietary' or 'governmental'
may be instructive in determining whether city transit service is a 'traditional' function
within the meaning of National League of Cities. . . ." Id. at 4. Third, the court held that
the city failed to address the bus drivers' contention that the city had waived any possible
immunity under National League of Cities when it accepted federal funds to purchase a
private carrier under a section of the UMTA which was designed to protect "individual
employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment." 49
U.S.C. § 1609(c)(3) (1976) Order denying motion to dismiss at 4. But see UTU v. LIRR, slip
op. at 5615 n.26. The bus drivers argue that this agreement has been violated by the city's
failure to comply with the FLSA wage and hour provisions, and has in effect worsened their
(the drivers') position relative to employees of a private transit system. Id. at 4-5.
193. 7 Wall. 71 (1869).
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sphere of essential government activity and the current extension
of such exclusion to local commuter rail service (which was reinforced in decisions such as United States v. California and California v. Taylor), is subject to re-examination. Upon re-inspection,
local commuter rail service, in the face of conflicting congressional
policy pronouncements, 19 and in light of the important role it
plays in the effective functioning of any metropolitian region,195
can be considered an "essential governmental function" and
thereby exempt from federal regulation under either the RLA or
the FLSA.
Sharon A. Souther

194. See notes 123-35 supra. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
195. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. International Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); New York City Transit Auth. v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154
N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), a/J'd, 3 N.Y.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d
Dep't 1957); Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1976)).

